In Jordan, the growing fiscal pressures and the need for efficient public spending have once again highlighted the need to evaluate and restructure the country's independent public institutions. These entities, established over the past decades to serve specific regulatory or service-oriented functions, have expanded significantly—some overlapping with existing ministerial responsibilities. This expansion has raised questions about the efficiency and necessity of maintaining all of these institutions in their current form.

 

According to Jordan’s 2025 budget, allocations for independent institutions are expected to surpass 1.3 billion JOD, accounting for more than 15% of total current expenditures. This level of spending—nearly 3% of the country's GDP—underscores the urgency of ensuring that these funds are yielding high returns in terms of public service delivery. Particularly when fiscal resources are tight, prioritizing efficiency and fairness in resource allocation becomes a national imperative.

 

Reform attempts date back to the 2019 public sector roadmap, which proposed integration and consolidation among entities with overlapping mandates. However, little has materialized. Despite the consistent emphasis in Royal directives and Letters of Designation to governments, tangible progress remained limited until recently. Encouragingly, the current government appears to be taking the issue more seriously, with the creation of a dedicated Minister of State for Public Sector Reform and a central reform unit—a signal that Jordan may finally move beyond diagnosis and towards implementation.

 

Lessons from successful local reforms lend credibility to these efforts. Jordan has previously restructured its security agencies—consolidating the Civil Defense, Gendarmerie, and Public Security Directorate into a unified force. Similarly, the 2008 subsidy reform, which phased out fuel subsidies while introducing targeted social support, demonstrated that strategic restructuring is both feasible and beneficial when grounded in social and political realism.

 

International experience further reinforces this path. Greece, facing a fiscal crisis, undertook significant institutional restructuring, reducing the number of public entities and saving nearly 0.5% of GDP annually. Tunisia and Egypt also consolidated redundant authorities to cut costs and enhance coordination. These examples highlight that well-planned mergers not only save money but also improve accountability and governance.

 

In Jordan’s context, rationalizing independent institutions must go beyond cost-cutting. The objective should be to enhance institutional efficiency and clarify roles. Some institutions could be merged into ministries, others restructured, and some, if found ineffective, phased out. Equally, attention should turn to higher education: Jordan has over 10 public universities, one in nearly every governorate. While this ensures geographic access, it also raises concerns about duplication and financial sustainability. A review of their governance models and potential consolidation could ensure better academic outcomes and more prudent spending.

 

The success of such reforms hinges on a clear framework for evaluation and accountability. Independent, evidence-based assessments must guide decisions on which institutions to keep, restructure, or dissolve. The goal should be to align these bodies with national priorities and ensure they deliver value for money.

 

Jordan has shown that it can manage complex reforms when there is clarity, leadership, and public support. The time is right to extend that momentum to the structure of its independent public institutions—toward a leaner, more effective, and more accountable public sector.