The region is entering a new phase of confrontation, with the renewed spread of chaos emerging as one of its defining features. Iran is seeking to use its regional instruments to threaten security and stability and demonstrate its ability to widen the scope of confrontation. This phase is taking multiple forms, beginning with missile and drone attacks and threats to maritime navigation, extending to strikes against energy facilities and their sources and alternatives, and potentially reaching the targeting of civil aviation and airports, as well as the activation of cells operating on the ground.

 

These challenges are becoming more significant amid the mounting pressure on Tehran and the possibility that its confrontation with the United States could enter a more decisive phase. A growing sense of having fewer options may push Iran to make greater use of its instruments of pressure and influence, raising the cost of confrontation for regional countries and opening new fronts for escalation. Developments in the Red Sea, the threats facing Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and events across the wider geography surrounding Israel all point to an expanding confrontation unfolding across multiple arenas. This requires regional states to prepare for scenarios that extend beyond direct military escalation.

 

Jordan is not removed from this challenge. Attempts to exploit regional circumstances to activate domestic networks or undermine societal stability require the country to approach national security as an integrated system. Security cannot be confined to protecting borders and state institutions, it must also include safeguarding civil peace and preventing external pressure from being transformed into internal divisions. Protecting Jordan’s stability must therefore remain a central element of strategic thinking in the period ahead, particularly in a regional environment where confrontation can increasingly shift from one arena to another.

 

The greater challenge, however, is not simply how to respond to the current escalation, but the need to reconsider the very concept of security. This is where the idea of re-engineering security becomes essential. In an environment shaped by changing and increasingly complex threats, the state must develop its capacity to confront not only threats directed at its institutions, but also the traps, pressures and forms of influence targeting society itself. The objective is to move beyond responding to threats after they materialise and towards building the capacity to anticipate and contain them, while strengthening societal resilience and public confidence in state institutions.

 

For this reason, security strategy cannot be separated from cultural strategy. Rebuilding society cannot be achieved through security measures alone, it also requires a cultural approach that restores trust within society. A state's ability to confront threats depends not only on the effectiveness of its institutions, but also on the cohesion of its society and its capacity to resist polarisation and external influence. As trust declines and divisions widen, the domestic environment becomes more vulnerable to exploitation, making challenges harder to contain even when the state possesses the necessary tools to address direct threats.

 

The state must recognise that delaying this process will increase the scale of the challenges and may eventually make them more difficult to manage. What is needed today is not merely a review of security policies or a change in institutional thinking and approach. It is also necessary to develop broader ways of confronting these challenges while redefining the relationship between security and society. Sustainable security cannot rest on security measures alone. It requires a social environment capable of accommodating differences, strengthening a shared sense of belonging and maintaining trust between citizens and state institutions.

 

Most importantly, the re-engineering of security strategies must be matched by the reconstruction of societal culture. This means moving away from a culture of suspicion, accusations of disloyalty, exclusive thinking and the treatment of difference as a threat, towards a culture that embraces diversity and accepts disagreement. Such a process cannot begin and end with individual initiatives or limited programmes. It requires a clear political decision and a long-term state vision that brings together security, cultural and social instruments within a sustained effort. One that does not respond to crises alone, but also seeks to build lasting resilience against future challenges.

 

Ultimately, the region faces two parallel tasks, re-engineering security thinking on the one hand, and reconstructing societal culture on the other. Progress in one without the other will not be sufficient to confront the challenges ahead. A state capable of protecting its security is not merely one that can thwart threats. It is also one that preserves social cohesion and prevents external pressure from turning into internal crises that threaten its stability over the long term.