With the United States threatening a return to war with Iran, and the possibility of further regional escalation, another danger is emerging that may not be receiving sufficient attention, the potential return of terrorist organisations, but through methods very different from those that ISIS previously used. The current regional landscape, with its instability, tensions and security challenges, could provide these organisations with an environment conducive to rebuilding themselves, not necessarily through territorial expansion and control, but through a return to clandestine and decentralised operations.

 

The issue today is not simply the return of existing organisations, but also the possibility of new formations adopting methods closer to Al Qaeda than to the ISIS model. This means moving away from public visibility, territorial expansion and the ambition to control cities or establish geographical influence. Instead, the emerging model could be more clandestine, focused on preserving networks and maintaining the ability to operate and inflict damage without the need to control territory or declare an identifiable organisational presence.

 

This brings us to the potential transition from lone wolves to isolated cells. While the lone-wolf model has relied on individuals acting independently and unpredictably, the potential evolution could involve small, decentralised cells with a degree of autonomy in decision-making and the ability to operate without a clear or direct operational connection to a central leadership. This could make the security challenge considerably more complex, particularly as traditional approaches become less effective in identifying patterns of activity that do not rely on visible organisational structures.

 

In this context, areas such as the Syrian desert, parts of Iraq and extending towards southern Syria represent geographical spaces with significant security challenges, particularly where state control is limited and local and regional dynamics overlap. Continued regional tensions could also divert security resources and attention, creating additional opportunities for these organisations to reorganise themselves and exploit existing vulnerabilities.

 

However, the most important challenge is not confined to geography. It lies within societies themselves. For many countries, the next phase of confrontation may not simply involve preventing the infiltration of individuals from abroad but also preventing the mobilisation of individuals already within their societies, some of whom have been exposed to extremist narratives for years, while others may have found in difficult economic and social conditions an environment conducive to embracing such ideas.

 

This shifts the confrontation beyond its immediate security dimension and into the political and societal sphere. Countering extremism cannot be limited to security institutions or religious discourse, because the problem is considerably broader. It is also connected to national discourse, media policies, cultural openness and the ability to address marginalisation, frustration and the absence of alternatives.

 

Urban planning, strengthening the presence of the state and its institutions, expanding opportunities for economic, social and cultural participation, and reinforcing people's sense of belonging and engagement in public life are all essential elements in building societal resilience against extremism.

 

Addressing the coming phase therefore requires a comprehensive vision that does not separate security from politics, economics, culture and planning. The religious dimension alone will not provide the solution. Equally, security measures, regardless of their effectiveness, will remain limited unless accompanied by policies capable of addressing the conditions that allow extremism to reproduce itself.

 

If Daesh experience was built around territorial control and the declaration of influence, the coming threat could take a different form, one that does not require controlling a city, declaring an emirate or raising a flag over a geographical area. It may be enough for an organisation to retain the ability to reach its targets, strike and disappear, while finding within societies an environment that allows it to rebuild its networks and maintain its presence.

 

Consequently, if the region moves towards further escalation, the coming confrontation will not simply be against organisations operating in specific geographical areas, but also against ideas and networks capable of reproducing themselves within societies. This is precisely where the strength of the state becomes dependent not only on its ability to pursue organisations after attacks have taken place, but also on its capacity to prevent the conditions that allow them to return.

 

The real danger may not lie in the organisation that appears before us, but in the one operating from within societies, seeking to remain invisible and relying on secrecy and surprise to re-establish its presence.