Jordan is entering the fifth review of its programme with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at a moment of unusual clarity. The reforms are being made. Fiscal discipline remains intact. But the assumptions that underpinned the programme, stable energy supply, predictable prices, and a relatively calm region, have collapsed. As policymakers from around the world are gathering next week in Washington DC for the Spring Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank, the question is no longer whether Jordan is implementing its programme and meeting its commitments. It is whether the IMF programme itself still fits the world for which it was designed.

 

Only a few months ago, the programme was performing as designed. Growth was approaching 2.7 per cent, inflation was close to 2 per cent, and the fiscal deficit was narrowing toward its 5 per cent target and medium-term Debt was declining toward 80 percent of GDP. These outcomes reflected deliberate policy choices: reforming the energy sector, controlling spending, and maintaining macroeconomic discipline despite a difficult regional environment. That environment has since changed, abruptly and decisively.

 

Jordan imports more than 90 percent of its energy. For years, its system relied on a relatively stable arrangement: natural gas supplied at roughly $8 per million BTU. Disruptions linked to the ongoing regional conflict have forced a shift toward liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports costing around $25 per million BTU, more than three times higher. At the same time, the government has expanded fuel subsidies to shield households and businesses from the full impact of rising prices.

 

The result is immediate and measurable. Energy-related fiscal pressures are now estimated at roughly JD250 million per month. This is not a temporary fluctuation. It is a structural shock to the cost base of the economy.

 

The impact is already visible in the macroeconomic outlook. The fiscal deficit, once projected at around 5 percent of GDP, might now be trending toward 9 percent. Public debt, expected to decline in the medium-term toward 80 percent of GDP, is instead expected to rise toward the high 80s. Inflation is projected to double, while growth is most likely slow to less than 2 per cent.

 

These numbers might suggest policy slippage. They do not. They reflect a programme confronting conditions it was never designed to absorb.

 

The IMF fifth review, expected to conclude during the Spring Meetings, will release approximately $240 million. This is an important signal of continued confidence in Jordan’s reform path. But it must be seen in context. At current pressure levels, that amount covers roughly one month of additional energy-related costs. The gap between financing needs and available resources is measured in billions, not millions.

 

This exposes a deeper policy issue. IMF programmes are designed to address domestic imbalances, fiscal deficits, inflation, structural inefficiencies. They work when outcomes are largely determined by national policy choices. That assumption is becoming less reliable.

 

Jordan today is not being tested on its willingness to reform. It is being tested on its ability to absorb the economic consequences of a war it did not start, does not control, and cannot influence. Energy supply decisions are being made elsewhere. Prices are being set elsewhere. The country’s macroeconomic trajectory is being shaped by events beyond its policy reach.

 

This is not unique to Jordan, but Jordan’s exposure makes the challenge particularly clear. The Economist recently ranked it among the three countries most economically affected by the current conflict, alongside Pakistan and Egypt. The reason is not simply geography. It is the degree of integration, through energy dependence, trade routes, and regional supply chains.

 

This has important implications for how Jordan’s situation should be understood. The support required from regional and international partners should not be framed as traditional assistance. It is not about dependency. It is about sharing the economic cost of a conflict whose effects extend far beyond its immediate participants.

 

Jordan has long played a stabilising role in a volatile region. That role carries tangible economic value. When regional instability imposes direct fiscal costs on such a country, the question is not whether support is justified, but whether the international system is structured to respond in a timely and adequate manner.

 

The IMF can, and should, provide flexibility. It can adjust targets, extend timelines, and recognize that current deviations are driven by external shocks. These are necessary steps. But they are not sufficient. Flexibility does not lower the cost of imported energy. It does not replace disrupted supply. It does not close financing gaps of the scale now emerging.

 

At the same time, the crisis reinforces the urgency of structural change. Investments in domestic energy sources and diversification of supply are no longer long-term policy goals; they are immediate strategic priorities. But energy alone is not enough. Jordan must also accelerate the mobilization of both domestic and international capital, leveraging institutions such as the Social Security Investment Fund, central bank facilities, and diaspora remittances, alongside targeted foreign investment, to finance high-impact national projects. This includes fast-tracking initiatives such as the National Water Conveyor, strengthening food security systems, and developing regional supply chain and transport corridors that position Jordan as a reliable alternative trade route in an increasingly fragmented region. In doing so, Jordan is not simply responding to a crisis; it is converting its constraints into a platform for resilience, self-reliance, and strategic relevance.

 

Bridging the immediate gap, however, will still require coordinated action. This includes timely financial support from key partners, particularly those with both the capacity and the strategic interest in regional stability. Similar support has been mobilized in past crises. The difference today is the speed and scale at which it must be deployed.

 

As discussions begin in Washington, the focus should not be limited to whether Jordan remains within the technical parameters of its programme. The more relevant question is whether those parameters still reflect the reality the country is facing.

 

Jordan is implementing reforms. It is acting responsibly. It is maintaining stability under pressure. But if a disciplined country cannot withstand the economic shock of a war it did not enter, then the problem is no longer the country, it is the system.

 

Wissam Rabadi — Former Minister of Planning and International Cooperation