A growing segment of the Jordanian elite today argues that the country must give unqualified priority to the economy: improving living conditions, reducing daily pressures, and focusing state capacity on growth and employment. Political reform and debates about democracy, they suggest, are secondary concerns—luxuries that do not resonate with the public and are not demanded by citizens in any meaningful way. Public opinion surveys seem to support this view, consistently showing that economic hardship dominates the concerns of Jordanians, especially young people, while trust in representative political institutions remains strikingly low. Political parties have yet to present themselves as credible actors, and Parliament does not command wide respect. These are real observations and reflect a broader public fatigue toward politics.

 

The problem begins when this descriptive reality is elevated into a guiding doctrine—when political weakness becomes a justification for postponing political reform or treating it as a burden on economic recovery. If some believe that Jordan should pursue economic reform independently of the political modernization process launched five years ago, despite the natural challenges that accompany any democratic transition, one must ask a simple but decisive question: Have we not tried this before? Was there not, in earlier decades, a dominant current within decision-making circles insisting that the economy must come first and that political openness could wait?

 

The results of that earlier experiment speak clearly. Prioritizing the economy while sidelining political reform did not produce sustainable development. It did not restore public trust or strengthen the legitimacy of successive governments. Instead, the erosion of political confidence turned every major economic decision, even those necessary and well-designed, into a political liability met with suspicion and resistance. This dynamic pushed the state toward appeasement policies aimed at avoiding social tension, gradually constraining economic decision-making and limiting the capacity for growth and innovation. In practice, the absence of political reform weakened the economy rather than protecting it.

 

Within this debate, the Chinese model—often described as “liberal authoritarianism,” is frequently invoked as evidence that strong economic performance is possible without political openness. Yet this model is inseparable from China’s unique historical, cultural and demographic context, none of which parallels the Jordanian experience. Rentier states that sustain social stability through abundant oil revenues present another tempting comparison, but their structural realities differ fundamentally from those of a small, resource-constrained country like Jordan. Such comparisons overlook a basic truth: states like Jordan cannot build durable economic strength without political legitimacy, credible institutions, and broad-based public trust.

 

This is not abstract theorising. It is the core argument of Why Nations Fail, authored by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, one of the most influential works examining the relationship between political institutions and economic performance. The book argues that nations prosper not because they adopt sound economic policies alone, but because they build inclusive political institutions—institutions that distribute power, prevent monopolies, enforce transparency, and ensure accountability. These institutions are not merely normative ideals; they are economic assets. They reduce risk, provide predictability, create incentives for investment and innovation, and ensure that rules apply equally rather than shifting with personalities or circumstances. Nations fail not only because their economies falter, but because their political institutions become extractive, exclusive or unresponsive.

 

Seen through this lens, the debate over whether the economy or democracy should come first becomes a false dichotomy. Democracy is neither a luxury nor an additional burden; it is a precondition for state strength and a determinant of economic resilience. Political trust is, in effect, an economic variable. Participation is a stabilising force. The rule of law is as vital to investment as it is to justice.

 

Jordan’s decision to pursue a comprehensive modernization path—linking political, economic, and administrative reform—is therefore not symbolic or ornamental. It represents the most coherent and pragmatic route available to a country with Jordan’s structure and history. It is the pathway through which the state can protect its economy from political fragility, enhance institutional capacity, and rebuild trust with citizens, especially youth, who form the backbone of the country’s future.

 

Ultimately, an economy cannot flourish in a vacuum. It cannot thrive in an environment of depleted trust or weak institutions. Genuine economic reform requires a strong state, and a strong state cannot take shape without credible political institutions, accountability, and the rule of law. It may well be that Jordanians today feel more immediately concerned with economic pressures than with democratic reform—but this is a description of sentiment, not a blueprint for policy. A stable, competitive economy requires a solid political foundation. Political reform, therefore, is not a parallel track but the necessary gateway to economic strength.