Despite the harsh and difficult circumstances confronting Hamas—particularly in the Gaza Strip—this has not delayed the movement’s internal and supplementary organisational elections aimed at rebuilding its leadership ranks following Israel’s assassination of several of its leaders. A new head of the movement and a new Political Bureau are expected to be selected in the coming days.

 

The two main candidates for the leadership are Khaled Meshaal, the former head of Hamas, and Khalil Al Hayya, the deputy head of the movement in Gaza. These elections are, by necessity, far from normal or conventional contests between two individuals or rival factions. Rather, they represent the most critical turning point in the movement’s history, one that will shape its strategic direction in the coming phase, at an exceptional and decisive moment—especially in the aftermath of the war of annihilation on Gaza, with the future of the Strip still suspended between American plans, Israel’s occupation of nearly half of it, and a regional–international decision preventing Hamas from returning to govern Gaza.

 

Khalil Al Hayya has traditionally been associated with the current led by Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif, which held the greatest weight in Gaza and believed firmly in alliance with Iran and the so-called “axis of resistance.” This current had been critical of Khaled Meshaal’s policies during his previous leadership, particularly after the Arab Spring and regarding his stance on the Syrian revolution. Meshaal, by contrast, represents a second line within the movement—one more inclined towards pragmatism and political flexibility. He enjoys strong relations with Turkey and seeks to build bridges with Arab governments and states, in order to prevent Hamas from sliding into deeper regional isolation.

 

The options available to both candidates are extremely limited, whether in Gaza or at the regional level. Militarily, Israel’s demand is clear: Disarmament and the dismantling of Hamas’s political and military structures. Politically, there are intense pressures to eliminate the movement altogether—and even to target Islamist currents associated with it. This places a central question before both contenders: What is the strategic exit from the current existential impasse?

 

At present, Al Hayya appears to lack a clear answer, at least in the short term. He remains tied to a current that wagered on the “axis of resistance” and the unity of arenas—a current that played the dominant role in leading Hamas in recent years, especially during and after the “Al Aqsa Flood” .Yet, this axis has all but unraveled: Much of Hizbollah’s military capacity has been destroyed; Israeli-American conditions now revolve around dismantling its weapons; the party is under intense pressure within Lebanon’s internal equation; and Iran itself is grappling with deep economic and domestic crises, alongside widespread protests in its cities.

 

Meshaal, on the other hand, while fully aware of the severity of the current phase, proposes strengthening Hamas’s relations with Turkey and the Arab environment, and maintaining the highest possible degree of flexibility and adaptation in order to navigate this critical juncture and preserve the movement’s survival. His approach seeks to balance keeping the option of resistance alive while expanding the political dimension of Hamas’s discourse and its relations with Arab states in the coming period.

 

It is true that the path before Meshaal is far from smooth in terms of forging a new trajectory for the movement and reorganising its internal and regional standing. However, regional instability and the policies of Netanyahu’s government may offer Hamas opportunities for political breakthroughs. Al Hayya, by contrast, appears to have no alternative strategic options to offer, nor does he propose a departure from the current course.

 

According to sources and analyses close to Hamas circles, the competition between the two men is fierce and their chances are nearly equal. Yet a new and different tendency seems to be emerging within Gaza’s Hamas circles—particularly among Izza Al Din Haddad, the new commander of the movement’s military wing, the Izz Al Din Al Qassam Brigades. This tendency favours granting Meshaal’s current a greater political and regional role, in an effort to ease the pressure on Hamas in Gaza, which faces bitter choices between efforts to eliminate it, a catastrophic humanitarian situation, and the continued presence of forced displacement on the agenda of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government—and possibly that of President Trump—while nearly half of the Strip remains under Israeli occupation and reconstruction faces immense and complex obstacles.