Officials in Moscow have so far tried to frame the conference on refugee returns that was held in Damascus on 11-12 November as a sincere attempt on behalf of the Syrian regime who cares about the fate of their citizens. Yet it is precisely this kind of behavior that sows confusion among the Syrians, particularly among the country’s intelligentsia loyal to Assad: Why would Russia continue to play along with Assad’s propaganda if it can take a more measured stance instead?

 

 

Indeed, even the loyalists of the Syrian regime, who had left the country for Moscow and found employment in the propaganda networks including RT and Sputnik, acknowledge the drawbacks of Russia’s narrative. The problem does not end with the conversation between journalists and translators, who cast doubts on the real purposes of the conference, which made its way into the RT Arab broadcast by mistake. The problem goes deeper and stems from the real opinions of Syrians on Russia’s role in the country.

 

 

During my prolonged stay in Syria at the end of 2018, I made the most of my opportunity and asked local officials all sorts of uncomfortable questions seeking truthful answers. Interestingly enough, it was not the Syrians who first expressed nervousness about my queries, but Russian journalists and businessmen from the delegation. They did not make an attempt to sweep thorny issues I discussed with the Syrians under the rug. Instead, they just blamed all the problems on “terrorists and their sponsors”, as well as on “liberals in Moscow”. Later, the Syrians who organized the trip patted me on the back, smiling. “At least they [Syrian officials] take notice of your questions instead of ignoring them altogether, which is quite the leap”.

 

 

Another Syrian whom I spoke to, an employee of Russia’s radio broadcast station, just recycled old Russian propaganda’s cliches about ‘Syrian democracy’ that goes hand in hand with the ‘religious tolerance’ cultivated in the country. A self-described ‘Sunnite from a religious family from the Eastern Aleppo’, his stories were met by our delegation with avid interest. Notably, however, none of us had ever seen him praying. One morning we took a stroll near the ruined - and largely deserted - part of Eastern Aleppo. I asked him, jokingly, whether, if Syria was indeed free and democratic as he had told us, he could dare to tear down the placards with Bashar Assad’s face that adorned the street. He gave me a turgid expression before responding, also in a somewhat joking tone: ‘Do you want me to get shot right here?’

 

 

Another paradox is that the Russian propaganda has grown used to taking the ‘friendliness’ Syrian elites as a given that part of the Russian population supporting the authorities - known as ‘Putin’s majority’ – has come to believe that the Syrian regime may not be responsible for any repressions within Syria. It is not a coincidence that even Russian expert community had for some years consistently held a view that Assad lived in a vacuum of information, the vacuum guarded by the clique of generals. The reality appeared somewhat different. On one occasion I witnessed one Syrian official responding to a phone call from the Syrian president during one of the meetings. It became apparent that Assad has direct access to his subordinates instead of receiving patchy and second-hand information, as the conventional wisdom had it.

 

 

Subsequently, I grew increasingly convinced that there is a demand on behalf of Syrians in Latakia and Damascus for a more nuanced propaganda than the one that has been peddled and encouraged by the Russian media. Seen in this context, the PR war that broke out in Spring. The PR war involved the deluge of articles containing criticism of Bashar Assad. They were published in the media owned by Evgeny Prigozhin, a Russian businessman who also oversees the private military companies. The campaign served as a lightning rod for grievances accumulated in the public. It also sparked the counter-wave of disapproval on behalf of Damascus towards Moscow. That said, publications of the Russian media were not inspired by journalistic vigour prompting them to expose Assad’s corruption and economic problems in

 

 

Syria. Instead, the publications were overseen by political operatives who saw to bolster the ‘campaign against corruption’ narrative promulgated in some of the Syrian media. This allowed shifting the focus of public criticism away from the authorities and towards the figures of such businessmen as Rami Makhlouf.

 

 

Ostensibly, the attempts by the regime to emulate struggle against corruption, declare amnesties, and expanding the scope of free expression - even criticize the justice system – is congruent with Russia’s approach to legitimize Assad’s rule. Moreover, according to one popular narrative, it is Moscow who has nudged the Syrian regime into those actions. For example, the authorities’ declaration of local amnesty before the conference on refugees is seen by some as a result of Moscow’s pressure that came not least in the form of visit by Alexander Bastrykin, Chairman of the Investigative Committee of Russia, to Damascus in October. However, this version of events can hardly survive a clash with reality. It would not be the first time Assad declares amnesty in the Autumn. Nor is Bastrykin’s visit was unprecedented event, as he had paid regular visits to Syria before. Russian Investigative Committee had on past occasions indicted (in absence) the HTS fighters or even the Russian soldiers who broke the rules of conduct.

 

 

Thus, Moscow did not just fail to ride the wave of ‘fake thaw’ in the Syrian domestic policies. Five years after the intervention, Moscow’s actions in the region remain misunderstood by the ordinary Syrians who are loyal to the Assad regime. As a result, they are left guessing the factors behind Russia’s waywardness in the support of their allies. They also note the absence of strategic dialogue between Moscow and Damascus that would help shed light on the factors that make Russia hesitate before taking crucial decisions on matters where Syrian «stability» and «security» is involved. The problem, in all likelihood, lies in that the Kremlin itself does not have a proper answer to this question. The real issue of Russia’s approach to allies is that the Kremlin either remains tolerant of her allies’ ventures, or tries to micromanage it to the point that causes counter-reaction. Effectively, Syria is becoming more important to Russia, than Russia is to Syria.

 

 

This misunderstanding is the key paradox of Russia-Syria relations. As a result, post-conflict Damascus, oscillating between the approach of imitating stability within the country – and the option of more advanced reformist ‘window-dressing’ and reconciliation with the loyal opposition formations, as advocated by Moscow – is trying to trudge a third path that would be a triangulation of those two methods. In essence, this means emulating competitive and democratic elections without any substantive reforms. The Kremlin seems to be reconciled with this approach. As the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov argued during his September trip to Syria, the presidential elections in Syria are not tied to the work of the Constitutional Committee. This was a sensational statement given the fact that in recent years Russian diplomats viewed the 2021 presidential elections as a test for their favored approach of ‘decorative democracy’ in Syria.