In the PLO, he promised to appoint a deputy president. In Fatah- and this is what really matters- he announced a general amnesty, allowing for the reinstatement of members who had been dismissed, albeit without confirming whether senior figures would return to their previous positions.

 

The two key figures this announcement concerns are two former Central Committee members: Mohammad Dahlan and Nasser al-Qudwa. Both men had been ousted following major disputes with President Abbas. They were dismissed from all their positions, both in Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, and eventually left the country. Both men have remained politically active, as independents, but neither of them recognized the legitimacy of the decision to expel them.

 

Both the dismissals and the recent amnesty decision are symptoms of a deep crisis in the movement. This crisis has been aggravated by the absence of Fatah’s godfather, Yasser Arafat, whose death left a leadership vacuum that undermined Fatah and its role in the Palestinian political landscape.

 

Arafat was not merely the leader of Fatah; he was the head of an institutional hierarchy. Indeed, Arafat was not constrained by regulations or laws that defined his powers, nor was he subject to the kind of accountability that conventional party leaders have to deal with, whether by the government or opposition. He was a tribal chief with absolute authority whose word was law.

 

However, his leadership was not immune to vehement opposition. Rejection of his position and methods led to the formation of factions and triggered splits, rebellions, and defections. He had a talent for hollowing out opponents; however, he undermined their influence without getting rid of them outright.

 

His power was built on several intertwined and complementary pillars. The first was the Fatah Movement. The second was the structure of the PLO, which he built through a robust alliance with independent forces representing broad segments of society: social, regional, tribal, and local leaders. The third was his overwhelming popular support, which no of his contemporaries, no traditional leader and politician, could rival.

 

These strengths built the solid foundations of his leadership. With the help of his distinctive talents and charms, he used these foundations to open doors in the Arab world and convinced the international community that he had been best equipped to engage with them on every issue tied to the Palestinian cause.

 

The decades he spent at the center of Palestinian life, which were marked by a bold and heroic struggle, made him a leader, a popular hero, and an icon who no one could compete with.

 

However, building the movement around this figure with rare qualities left negative consequences. One was that it undermined the role of institutions to the point of functional paralysis. This problem became disastrous when Arafat passed away and left a vacuum that continues to weigh on Palestinian politics.

 

Abbas recognizes that he does not have Arafat’s knack for wielding influence, maintaining control, and filling voids. Even the primary rival to Arafat that emerged late on in his life, political Islam, did not deliver its knockout blow to Palestinian politics until after the death of this extraordinary figure. Fatah had long maintained an almost unchallenged monopoly over Palestinian leadership. Following Arafat’s departure, however, this dominance crumbled, creating a split n that is often called a second Nakba.

 

The Palestinian adage that “If Fatah is in good shape, then the Palestinian arena, with all its components, is in good shape-” proved accurate almost immediately after Arafat’s departure.

 

Although Fatah’s organizational and institutional structure had never been ideal, Arafat’s presence and charisma were enough to compensate for this problem, allowing the movement to maintain its leading position.

 

In losing him, Fatah thus lost an extraordinary figure who could fill voids, navigate crises, and sustain his position at the center of power. Second, his absence led to the collapse of institutions that had long relied on his strength, as they were left exposed without the man who had compensated for their shortcomings.

 

Since his departure, along with that of historical founders of the movement who had worked alongside him, Palestinian politics has gone from one crisis to another and faced unprecedented internal and external challenges.

 

Fatah, which had previously overcome its internal splits and solidified its leadership over the Palestinian arena, was undermined by infighting. By the time it competed in general elections without Arafat, Fatah found itself divided across three different electoral lists, losing the 2006 elections.

 

This, unfortunately for Abbas, under his leadership. He inherited not only Arafat’s position but all the burdens and weight that came with it.

 

Fatah’s ultimate challenge, then, is Arafat’s absence. Without a successor capable of rebuilding the movement it cannot regain its influence, it cannot revive its institutions and reinvigorate its cadres, who number in the hundreds of thousands but have no real function, status, or impact. Above all, and always, the movement must fix its relationship with its broad base of supporters, the Palestinian people who loved and embraced it, protecting Fatah far more effectively than its own top brass ever has.

 

The prevailing sentiment within Fatah, that of its vast army of marginalized members (the overwhelming majority), is that the movement needs a foundational and unifying general conference. This step could solve the issues plaguing the movement that has been drained by infighting, which has come at the cost of its leaders and its people dearly.

 

As for promoting ad-hoc measures as reform and relying on these measures to improve things, this approach would only deepen the crisis and amplify its implications for Fatah, the nation, and the Palestinian cause.