There is an ongoing second “Scramble for Africa” to secure food and mineral resources. And even though Russia does have an abundance of both of those, increasing its control over the continent will allow the Kremlin to put pressure on the access to these supplies for the West and China, greatly increasing its geopolitical leverage.

 

And perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this entanglement is how little risk it presupposes for the Kremlin. Because the mercenary groups are supposedly independent actors, even if their intervention fails to rescue the Bashir regime that failure will not be attached to Mr Putin – at least not in the eyes of the Russian populace.

 

Such a failure will put a dent into Russia’s ambitions to extend their influence into Africa, but it would not damage their already-established position in the region. And upholding another war criminal is hardly going to damage Russia’s international reputation at this point.

 

Conversely, many of Africa’s other problematic regimes will be looking with interest toward Moscow if the operation succeeds. As icing on the cake, there may be financial benefits for the Kremlin for backing vulnerable kleptocratic regimes across the continent, at a time when they are in rather dire financial straits.

 

A mutually-beneficial protection racket would be a sensible strategy for Russia to pursue on the continent – at least so long as the Kremlin can keep away from overt political commitments to any of these regimes, like the commitments they have to the Haftar faction of the Libyan civil war. Moscow can ill-afford becoming a declared belligerent in any more civil wars.

 

For his part, Bashir has little choice but to take any help he can get. Unpopular at home and sought by the ICC for war crimes and genocide for his conduct during South Sudan’s wars of secession, he does not have anywhere to go.

 

If he loses power, he is finished. This makes him just the kind of dependent client the Kremlin loves. For Russia, this is a no-brainer.