Israel’s decision to keep the region as a series of open, low-intensity operational theaters—capable of escalation at any moment—has reshaped its strategic priorities. Today, Syrian geography has returned to the top of Israel’s security agenda. And although Israel’s most visible escalation remains concentrated on three parallel fronts—Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank—the practical Israeli assessment that Gaza and Lebanon are deeply interconnected sustains the possibility of limited ground incursions inside Gaza and the continued targeting of Hamas leaders. This same logic also explains the pattern of Israeli strikes in Lebanon, which extend to both Hamas and Hizbollah operatives, and naturally pushes the confrontation toward the Syrian theatre.

 

The Golan front, once a central pillar of Iran’s “Unified Arenas” project, is now the arena Israel is determined to remove entirely from any future equation of conflict. Since Ahmad Al-Shar’a’s visit to Washington, Israel has been sending a clear message: it is the primary actor on the ground in southern Syria, and its overriding objective is the full demilitarisation of the area. Netanyahu’s visit to the south—alongside senior security chiefs—cemented the view that this geography is now considered an essential extension of Israel’s national security architecture.

 

This approach transforms southern Syria into a battlefield that extends far beyond the fight against traditional terrorist organisations. It positions the area as a critical buffer against any presence linked to Iranian-backed militias, Hizbollah, or Hamas. The absence of a central authority, coupled with the operational flexibility the terrain offers, makes the southern front a potential soft underbelly that could enable attacks on Israel—while simultaneously sparing Lebanon from Israel’s retaliatory calculus. Hizbollah, even as it weighs limited responses to the rising pace of assassinations targeting its commanders, cannot risk triggering a broader conflict that would expose Lebanon to devastating strikes or unravel the internal balance that sustains its current political influence.

 

Meanwhile, the West Bank is witnessing a sharp escalation, including operations in densely populated areas such as Hebron, Beit Ummar and Kiryat Arba, as Israel seeks to reinforce its security presence in the southern West Bank. This escalation sustains Israel’s multi-front operational strategy and widens the spectrum of confrontation and its potential regional ramifications.

 

For Jordan, the transformation of its northern frontier into an open-ended operational space, short of an all-out war but indicative of a prolonged low-intensity conflict, creates a new and volatile reality. Southern Syria may witness shifting forms of confrontation involving multiple actors, while the intensifying escalation in the West Bank could produce unprecedented security dynamics. These developments place Jordan in a position where adopting non-traditional and highly adaptive security approaches becomes not just prudent, but necessary.

 

Jordan now faces security challenges of a scale it has not confronted before, particularly concerning southern Syria and the possibility of expanded hostilities involving terrorist groups or Iranian-aligned militias. Israel’s demilitarisation strategy in the south will not unfold without friction or targeted operations, placing Jordan’s border regions under direct risk, especially given the diversity of possible attack vectors, ranging from drones to short-range rockets. Such threats put populated areas and critical infrastructure, including power plants and refineries, in the line of fire.

 

The region is now entering what can be described as the second phase of escalation, a phase marked by open fronts, uninterrupted escalation potential, and widening zones of confrontation. Navigating this phase requires a meticulous strategy at both the domestic and regional levels. The priority now is to ensure safe passage through this period before the arrival of what could become the third phase of escalation, a stage that may involve the settling of accounts, the closing of fronts, and the imposition of new realities on borders, demography and political structures.

 

What is being reshaped today may define the landscape of the Middle East for decades to come.