The rapid collapse of the RSF in Khartoum began with the loss of the Republican Palace, which had major military and psychological repercussions.

 

I do not understand those who, with perverse logic, seek to frighten people by claiming that the army’s victory in Khartoum will aggravate the situation and make the division of Sudan more likely. The truth is that the army’s victory does not threaten Sudan’s unity; its victory safeguards Sudan’s territorial integrity and thwarts sick plans to carve it up. The army’s defeat would open the door to dividing the country and its collapse, allowing opportunists, predators, and conspirators to profit.

 

Others fuel skepticism from a different angle, arguing that after liberating Khartoum, the army might not be eager to keep waging the war in Darfur. They claim that this could leave the region under RSF control, allowing them and their Tasis allies to establish a parallel government that ultimately leads Sudan to partition.

 

This narrative also makes insidious insinuations. It implies that the army is not interested in Darfur and has solely focused on liberating Khartoum, and before that, Al-Jazira. The goal is to incite racial and regional divisions, pitting the North and the Center against the periphery through the lie that the army will not show the same enthusiasm and determination in the battles in Darfur.

 

These claims are a desperate attempt to spoil the public’s mood following the liberation of Khartoum and the other regions reclaimed by the army, leaving the RSF in control of only the capitals and parts of four out of Darfur’s five states, along with parts of Kordofan.

 

The objective is to sow confusion, despair, and fear, in the hope that this will compel the army command to resume negotiations with the RSF, a prospect that is becoming increasingly far-fetched. In fact, many now believe that the window for negotiations has closed and that the army has no intention of giving the RSF a chance to regroup. Sudan’s military leadership has explicitly said that the only terms it would accept are the disarmament of the RSF and the surrender of its remaining positions, refusing to grant immunity to those implicated in crimes. They have also emphasized that the RSF and its leadership will have no political or military role in the future.

 

This unyielding position reflects the prevailing public sentiment, as the split between the majority of Sudan’s people and the RSF has deepened as a result of the group’s widespread human rights violations and its destruction of civilian property and state facilities.

 

It is worth noting that the alarm over Sudan’s partition resurfaces after every major victory by the army and its allied forces, as seen following the victories in Al-Jazira. Similar concerns were also raised in discussions about the parallel government that had envisioned and hoped to establish headquarters in Khartoum. At the time, and at present, the claim was that his government would entrench the partition of Sudan: army-controlled areas in the center, north, east, and southeast administered from the government in Port Sudan, and RSF-controlled regions of Darfur, Kordofan, and Khartoum. That, at least, was the plan.

 

Just days before the army entered the Republican Palace, RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) finally made an appearance through a hastily recorded video message. His speech was clearly a response to reports of mass defections, and he sought to boost his forces’ morale and convince them to keep fighting. In a message that quickly proved unconvincing and was overtaken by fast-moving developments, he insisted that his forces would not withdraw from the palace, Al-Muqran, the cabinet headquarters in central Khartoum, and other strategic sites, and promised to make up for lost ground and emerge victorious.

 

Not only did Hemedti’s speech not have its intended effect, it also exposed the widening rift between the RSF leadership and its crumbling forces, who are becoming increasingly vocal about their discontent with commanders, with many audio and video recordings coming to light.

 

While the decisive victory in Khartoum is significant, it does not mean the war is over. There is still a long way to go, but it is a turning point that will have major implications for the outcome of the conflict.

 

The army will now shift its attention to Kordofan and Darfur, following the declaration it made, alongside its allied forces, that it will immediately take the battle there to liberate every last inch up to the country’s territory. With this announcement, it directly rebuked the claims intended to spread fears of division.